Under certain conditions, Canadian and international accounting standards allow firms to present R&D costs in their balance sheets (capitalization). This article analyzes the determinants of new capitalizations of R&D costs by focusing on positive accounting theory and the influence of the CEO. Based on a sample of 440 observations of Canadian firms between the years 2000 and 2003, the results show that the size, debt load, presence of a CEO who holds an important but not majority block of shares, and CEO's years of seniority all influence the decision to present new capitalizations of R&D costs. The presence on the board of an important stockholder other than the CEO attenuates the influence of the CEO.
Introduction
Disclosing relevant financial information is a challenge for firms in the new economy. In these firms, intellectual capital plays a predominant role in their resources. According to some classifications, R&D projects, with their human capital, are a component of intellectual capital. One means used to disclose the scope of intellectual capital is to present R&D expenditures in the firm's financial statements.
Under certain conditions, the capitalization of R&D expenses is permitted by both international accounting rules (International Accounting Standard n° 38) and those applying in Canada (chapter 3064 of the Manual of the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants). However, American accounting rules explicitly forbid capitalization of R&D costs (Statement of Financial Accounting Standard n° 2), except for those involved in the development of software proven to be technologically feasible (SFAS n° 86).
Despite the strict capitalization criteria set by Canadian and international standards (but also because of asymmetric information), it is ultimately top managers of the firms subjected to these standards who decide whether to capitalize their R&D costs or to immediately recognize them as an expense.
This study examines the determinants of new capitalizations of R&D costs. In a given financial year, a new capitalization consists in entering as assets some or all of the R&D costs of that year, regardless of whether certain amounts have already been capitalized in previous years.
To our knowledge, this study is the first to adopt this dynamic approach, which makes it possible to observe a firm's behavior over time. Although the measure of new capitalizations has been used by Ding et al. (2004) , their study, which is based solely on the year 2000, does not allow this kind of follow-up (a limitation recognized by the authors, p. 103). Landry and Callimaci (2003) note only whether or not R&D costs are entered as assets in the balance sheet of a given year, without distinguishing between new capitalizations and capitalizations reported in previous years.
Canadian firms in sectors that invest heavily in R&D have been selected. The final sample is composed of 440 firm-year observations, and the data collected cover the years 2000 to 2003. Of these observations, 73 (16%) firms report new capitalizations. Over time, the number of new capitalizations declines consistently.
The determinants of new capitalizations tested have been inspired by writings on positive accounting theory, a theory used to predict the choice of accounting methods. Added to these determinants are variables referring to the influence of the CEO.
The tests run use both univariate (Student's ttest) and multivariate (multiple regression logistic) analyses. In the multivariate analysis, several control variables are used: financial year, sector of activity, listing on American stock markets, and capitalization of R&D costs in previous years.
The results show that smaller firms and those with a very high debt load tend to present new capitalizations of R&D costs. These results support positive accounting theory.
Regarding the CEO's influence, the results indicate that firms whose CEOs are important stockholders are more likely to present new capitalizations. However, this fact is valid only for participants holding between 11% and 50% of the shares. Further, firms whose CEOs have many years of seniority are more likely to report new capitalizations. Finally, the presence of a board member who is a large stockholder but not a company executive appears to moderate the influence of top management and the reporting of new capitalization. In this case, new capitalization reporting tends to decline.
The results of this study should shed light on the strategies firms employ to disclose information concerning R&D costs. These results could also open new avenues for the definition and evaluation of strategies used to disclose information concerning intellectual capital in general.
The rest of the article is structured as follows: a study of the theoretical foundations of the argumentation (part 1) will be followed by a description of the methodology (part 2). Part 3 presents the empirical results obtained. A conclusion and a discussion of the results end the article.
Theoretical foundations
A presentation of the current of research on determinants of accounting choices (1.1) is followed by a presentation of the determinants of the capitalization of R&D costs (1.2) and by the influence wielded by the CEO.
Determinants of accounting choices
The choice of accounting methods has been the topic of several studies. These studies have all revolved around the studies of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Watts and Zimmermann (1978, 1986) , which explain accounting decisions based on positive accounting theory.
According to this theory, the accounting methods adopted are systematically linked to specific firm characteristics. The three hypotheses of positive accounting theory take into account the following factors: manager remuneration (decisions prompting an increase in accounting results); restrictive debt covenants (decisions favoring an increase in accounting results); and political visibility (decisions that favor a decrease in accounting results).
Empirical studies treating the choice of accounting methods have generally focused on linear or degressive methods of fixed asset amortization (Hagerman and Zmijewski, 1981; Labelle, 1990); stock valuation methods (Holthausen, 1981; Labelle, 1990; Kuo, 1993) ; useful life of goodwill (Hall, 1993) ; and the methods for translating financial statements of foreign subsidiaries (Labelle, 1990; Bartov and Bodnar, 1996) . The results obtained in these studies-all of them North American-tend to provide empirical confirmation of positive accounting theory.
Determinants of the capitalization of R&D costs
The capitalization of R&D costs entails higher net earnings for the financial year concerned. However, owing to the permanence of accounting principles (Ding et al., 2004) , this increase in earnings will be realized in the long term only if the R&D expenses vary from one year to the next.
Very few studies have focused on the decision of whether or not to capitalize R&D costs, for a number of reasons. In the United States, capitalization has not been allowed since 1974 (except for the costs of developing software). In Europe, before the recent generalized adoption of international accounting standards, there were no homogeneous methods of accounting for R&D costs. Hoarau (1995) points out that accounting harmonization is not solely a matter of setting standards but that it must also involve the accounting practices of firms. Having clear standards is not enough; they must be adopted by firms. Further, Thibierge (2001) notes that there are significant differences (both in manner and detail) in the way intangible assets are presented in the financial statements of some European countries. Consequently, the interpretation of results is limited by the lack of details about R&D costs, such as new capitalizations for the year or the amount of subsidies received.
Daley and Vigeland (1983) investigate whether the capitalization of R&D costs is linked to variables capturing political visibility. Their study on a sample of American firms covers the year 1972. They chose that period because it preceded the beginning of the FASB's deliberations on the capitalization of R&D costs. Consequently, in 1972 accounting choices would not be influenced by any anticipated changes in accounting practices. These authors notice that companies that charge off their R&D costs are significantly larger, thus validating the hypothesis about political visibility. They point out that -while [political] costs may not be large on average, for larger firms far from covenants constraints it may be sufficient to cause avoidance of an accounting policy such as capitalization of R&D costs which was not widely followed‖ (p. 197 The study by Landry and Callimaci (2003) is, to our knowledge, the only one that has analyzed the determinants of capitalizing R&D costs in Canadian firms. Their study covers the 1997-1999 period and uses a sample of 434 firm-year observations. For a given firm and year, their observations consist in noting the presence of R&D costs among the assets entered on the balance sheet, but without distinguishing them from such costs reported in previous years. Their study thus differs from the one discussed in this article, which focuses on new capitalizations. Landry and Callimaci (2003) show that large size, profitability, and the existence of an important stockholder (either a CEO or not) act as variables likely to favor the immediate charge-off of R&D costs. In contrast, long established firms with a heavy debt load and high operating cash flows are likely to favor the capitalization of R&D costs.
The influence CEOs on earnings management
Given the leeway CEOs enjoy when applying the criteria for capitalizing R&D costs, the idea of possible earnings management cannot be pushed aside.
Works on agency theory (for example, Jensen and Meckling, 1976) separate firms into two categories: firms controlled by their CEO (when no owner holds at least 5% of the shares) and firms controlled by the stockholder (in the case where a stockholder holds at least 20% of the shares or where the CEO holds at least 10% of the shares). When CEOs control their firms, they are likely to partly appropriate the firm's resources or to make nonoptimal decisions. This theory is based on the premise that corporate stockholding should be dispersed, as is the case in the United States.
In countries where stockholding is much more concentrated (see La Porta, et al., 1999), the CEO- stockholder conflict is expressed in other terms. In Canada, for example, the principal stockholder is often also the CEO of his own firm. Non-optimal decisions are thus made to the detriment of minority stockholders. However, poorly managed firms can attract potential buyers. To counteract this possible threat, CEOs are motivated to manage accounting results so as to portray a more attractive financial situation. Fan and Wong (2002) confirm empirically that in certain East Asian firms, the quality of accounting results declines as the percentage of stocks held by CEOs rises. Similarly, Rakoto (2007) notes that Canadian firms whose CEOs are also important stockholders tend to choose a method that will allow firms to avoid adding impairment loss on goodwill to company results. Previous studies have not analyzed the extent to which stockholding by CEOs can lead to earnings management. For example, a CEO with a majority holding would have no fear of a takeover.
Besides their role as important shareholders, the influence of CEOs could also come into play when they act as chairman of the board and when they have many years of seniority-especially when compared with other members of the board.
Hypotheses, research plan, and data
This section discusses the hypotheses (2.1), measures of variables (2.2), research plan (2.3), data sources (2.4), and sample (2.5).
Hypotheses
In light of the theoretical foundations discussed in the preceding section, several hypotheses are advanced.
2.1.l Political visibility
Political visibility could be a determinant of the capitalization of R&D costs, because of its important role in accounting choices. 16 Several studies have used size as a variable for determining the influence of political visibility. For example, Watts and Zimmermann (1986) argue that large companies are more likely to be monitored and, consequently, they tend to lower their earnings. If the firm posts high earnings, regulatory agencies will tighten constraints on its operations; potential competitors might be drawn into its sector by high profitability; and, finally, unions will want to renegotiate salaries to obtain a better distribution of the firm's added value. Further, political visibility probably has a significant impact on capitalization policies, given that certain Canadian firms (especially those in the pharmaceutical and biotechnology sectors) receive subsidies from both the federal and provincial governments. In some cases, these grants represent an important source of funding. Consequently, these firms are prompted to portray themselves as less profitable than they actually are.
This leads to the following hypothesis:
H1: Companies that present new capitalizations of R&D costs tend to be less politically visible than companies that charge off their R&D costs.

Debt constraints
A critical debt level could have an impact on the firm's policy regarding its capitalization of R&D costs. Capitalization can allow firms to retreat from the critical thresholds of ratios set in debt covenants. 
H2: Companies that present new capitalizations of R&D costs have a heavier debt load than companies that charge off R&D costs.
Influence of the CEO
Previous studies conclude that managers present company results as attractively as possible, in order to minimize interference from external stockholders (Williamson, 1967; Smith, 1976; Dhaliwal, 1980; Landry and Callimaci, 2003) . This earnings management can take on even larger proportions when managers exert a strong influence over the board of directors (which is notably the case when a CEO is also chairman of the board or when he has many years of seniority).
At the start of his mandate, the CEO usually has little room to maneuver because, during this period, the board of directors is actively engaged in the firm's strategic process (Mace, 1971) CEOs who are important stockholders are motivated to manage results upward in order to prevent takeovers and to facilitate access to the best debt covenant terms. The first scenario can occur only when the CEO holds less than the majority of the shares.
H5: Companies whose CEOs are important stockholders are more likely to charge off R&D costs.
However, in firms with concentrated ownership, even if important stockholders are not actively engaged in managing the firm, they are nevertheless well informed because they have greater access to internal information. Consequently, owing to oversight by important stockholders, it is less probable that directors can get away with accounting adjustments (Smith, 1976; Landry and Callimaci, 2003).
H6:
Companies in which an important stockholder other than the CEO sits on the board of directors are more likely to charge off R&D costs.
The presence on the board of an important stockholder who is not an executive director is especially effective in counterbalancing the CEO's influence. The following supplementary hypotheses are thus advanced: 
Measures of variables
In this study, the manager is defined as the top person in charge of the firm's business operations. According to the information circulars of the firm's targeted, this person is designated under the title of -chief executive officer‖ or -chief operating officer.‖ The variables created in hypotheses H1 to H6 are operationalized in the rest of this section.
The dependent variable
The goal of this study is to analyze the determinants of new capitalizations of R&D costs in Canada. The dichotomous dependent variable -capitalization of R&D costs‖ is equal to:
(
1) if the firm has capitalized R&D costs in a given year; (0 ) if the firm has charged off the totality of R&D costs in a given year.
According to this measure, the same firm can receive code (1) for certain years and code (0) for others, depending on whether or not it decides to capitalize in each of the four years studied.
The independent variables
Consistent with the theory of political visibility, the variable size is largely used in studies on the choice of accounting methods.
Size is measured by the logarithm of total accounting assets (LOGA). The debt load represents the level of financial constraints borne by the company owing to its choices regarding financial debt and financial policy. It is measured by the weight of financial costs (WFIN), which is the ratio of financial costs over operating results.
The variable (PLUR) indicates the plurality of the CEO's functions. This dichotomous variable is equal to (1) if the CEO is also chairman of the board or to (0) otherwise.
The variable SENIORITY measures the CEO's seniority. It is the number of years the CEO has held his position.
The variable CEOMAJ designates a CEO who is an important stockholder. This dichotomous variable is equal to (1) if the CEO holds a block of 10% or more of the company's shares or to (0) otherwise.
The variable SHMAJ denotes the presence of an important stockholder on the board, other than an executive officer. This variable takes the value of (1) if an important stockholder with at least 10% of voting shares sits on the board of directors and (0) otherwise.
The control variables
Four control variables have been selected: listing on an American stock market, sector of activity, year, and capitalization of R&D costs in previous years. The choice and measure of these control variables are explained below.
In
To ensure that the differences observed in accounting methods are attributable to the independent variables chosen, the effects of the sector of activity are controlled, for R&D expenses are, by nature, sector specific (Lev and Sougiannis, 1996). The variable IND has been codified using seven dichotomous variables, which represent the eight sectors of activity selected. The variable YR has been codified by three dichotomous variables which represent the four years of observation.
Finally, the influence of previous capitalizations is also controlled. The specificity of this study is that it focuses on the new capitalizations of the year. However, to ensure that a previous capitalization does not affect subsequent ones (i.e. that the firm is following a particular policy of capitalizing R&D costs), the variable PRECAP is introduced in the regression models. This dichotomous variable takes the value (1) if a firm has capitalized R&D costs on its balance sheet in a year previous to the year observed and (0) otherwise.
INSERT HERE TABLE 1
Research plan
The research hypotheses will be tested by both univariate and multivariate analyses. The univariate analysis consists in a Student's t-test where the sample is divided in two, depending on whether or not the firm has presented a new capitalization of R&D costs during a given year. Given that the dependent variable is dichotomous and that the goal of this study is to identify the determinants of the capitalization of R&D costs, the multivariate analysis selected is the logistic regression. This regression has often been used in similar studies of the determinants of firms' accounting choices. 17 -Model 1 (firm j and year t, see the definition of the measure of variables in Table 1): CAP R&D jt = α 1 + β 1 LOGA jt + β 2 WFIN jt + Β 3 PLUR jt + β 4 SHMAJ jt + β 5 PLUR jt * SHMAJ jt + β 6 SENIORITY jt +β 7 MARK jt + β 8 IND jt + β 9 YR jt + β 10 PRECAP Model 2 below is equivalent to model 1, when the variable PLUR is replaced by the variable CEOMAJ. The two variables measure the CEO's influence from two different perspectives: the CEO as chairman of the board and the CEO as an important stockholder in the firm. These two variables are handled separately because, in most cases (65%) , an important stockholding CEO is also the chairman of the board. 
Sources of data
The firms included in the sample for this study were selected from the Stock Guide database. Accounting data, such as data on total assets, net earnings, and financial costs were also collected from this database. Detailed data on R&D costs, such as the amount capitalized, amortization, tax credits on investments, operating results, and information on ownership structure, were culled from financial statements and from the circulars available on the SEDAR website. Regarding information connected with the influence of the CEO-such as plurality of functions (a CEO who is also chairman of the board)-and with the structure of stockholding (whether the CEO is an important stockholder or not, whether or not another important stockholder sits on the board), these data were collected from the management proxy circulars available on the SEDAR website.
Sample
The sample is composed of Canadian firms operating in sectors of activity that are strongly committed to R&D and thus have high R&D costs. The sample selected includes all the firms in the Stock Guide data base and all the sectors whose average ratio of R&D activity for the 2000 to 2003 period exceeds 25%. The initial sample included 154 firms, representing eight sectors of activity. However, 44 firms had to be withdrawn because the data needed to test the hypotheses for one or more of the years studied were not found in their proxy circulars or financial statements. Table 2 
INSERT HERE TABLE 2
The results
This section presents the univariate tests (3.1), the multivariate tests (3.2), a sensitivity analysis of the results (3.3) and a synthesis of the results obtained and conclusion (3.4).
Univariate tests and analysis of collinearity between variables
According to Table 3 Table 4 and comparison of the two groups of firms (firms that do or do not present new capitalizations) points to significant differences in the variables: weight of financial costs (WFIN); influence of a CEO who is an important stockholder (CEOMAJ); and seniority of the CEO. Another significant difference pertains to the presence on the board of an important stockholder other than the CEO (variable SHMAJ), but it goes in the opposite direction of that predicted by hypothesis H6. Some firms show a negative weight for financial costs because their operating results are in the deficit. The sensitivity analysis in section 3.3 below shows that withdrawing all the observations with a negative financial-cost weight does not modify the results obtained.
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE
Analysis of
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE
The correlation matrix in Table 5 indicates that certain independent variables demonstrate a certain degree of collinearity. However, the correlation coefficients fall below the 0.67 threshold, above which a serious multicollinearity problem might exist.
INSERT HERE TABLE 5
Multivariate tests
According to Table 6 , all the hypotheses are confirmed, except the combined hypotheses H3 and H6a (influence of the CEO who is also chairman of the board and moderating effect of the presence of an important stockholder other than the CEO) and hypothesis H6 (presence of an important stockholder other than the CEO).
INSERT HERE TABLE 6
Sensitivity analysis of results
Two sensitivity analyses have been carried out. The first consists in withdrawing from the tests all the observations for which the weight of financial costs is negative. The results obtained from univariate and multivariate tests are similar to the initial results.
The second sensitivity analysis consists in observing the influence of the CEO/important stockholder when there is a variation in his percentage of shares. Table 7 shows the results obtained when the test (model 2 multivariate) was applied five times according to the following variations: -Sample limited to firms in which the CEO's percentage of shares varies from 0% to 10%. The CEO is considered an important stockholder when he holds between 5% and 10% of the shares. -Sample limited to firms in which the CEO's percentage of shares varies from 0% to 25%. Here the CEO is considered as an important stockholder when he holds between 11% and 25% of the shares. -Sample limited to firms in which the CEO's percentage of shares varies from 0% to 50%. The CEO is then considered as an important stockholder when he holds between 26% and 50% of the shares. -Sample limited to firms in which the CEO's percentage of shares varies from 0% to 75%. Here the CEO is considered as an important stockholder when he holds between 51% and 75% of the shares. -All the firms in the initial sample. The CEO is then considered as an important stockholder when he holds more than 75% of the shares.
The results show that the influence of a CEO who is an important stockholder exists only when his percentage of shares is situated between 11% and 50% (models CEOMAJ 0-25% and CEOMAJ 0-50%).
INSERT HERE TABLE 7
3.4
Synthesis of the results obtained and conclusion Table 8 sums up the results obtained.
INSERT HERE TABLE 8
The negative relation between new capitalizations of R&D costs and the size of the firm observed validates the political visibility hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, if the firm reports high earnings, regulators can tighten constraints on its operations. The results show that large firms, which are more politically visible, seem inclined to charge off R&D costs in order to reduce political costs. The results also show that debt load is an important determinant of the policy applied to the capitalization of R&D costs.
These results correspond to those obtained by Dhaliwal (1980) Firms that are about to exceed their debt covenant threshold tend to minimize their charges; they will thus be more likely to capitalize their R&D costs.
The results concerning the influence of the CEO are very interesting: the presence of a CEO who is an important stockholder will increase the chances R& D costs will be capitalized. Pushing the analysis a bit further, two elements come to light. First, in the case where the CEO has a weak holding (10% of the shares or less) or a majority holding (more than 50% of the shares), the results are not significant. This may mean that the CEO with a minority holding does not have the power to impose his own interests or that the CEO with a majority holding sees no threat of a takeover and finds no need to manage earnings. Second, when the CEO owns a large but not a majority holding (between 11% and 50%), the probability of capitalization is very strong. La Porta et al. (1999) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) show that agency problems in countries with concentrated ownership, such as Canada, emerge instead as conflicts of interest between the dominant stockholder and the other stockholders.
The results of the study also prove that the CEOs who have many years of seniority prefer to capitalize R&D costs. As their seniority increases so does their influence over the board, which gives them more power to push for their own interests. Further, the CEO's influence on the board will be even stronger if his seniority surpasses that of the other directors (Mace, 1971).
The last observation concerns the presence of an important stockholder on the board. The results show that the presence of an important stockholder on the board moderates the influence of the CEO. It would seem that when external directors with large holdings sit on the board they can keep an eye on the CEO and consequently reduce his influence.
From this perspective, the oversight of important stockholders helps to reduce the probability that R&D costs will be capitalized. 19 This study provides a better understanding of choices of accounting methods. Its specific goal consists in pinpointing the determinants of new capitalizations (by controlling for the influence of capitalizations in previous years), and the results obtained can be transposed to other accounting treatments such as that of intellectual capital. Cap 0 firms which charged off the totality of R&D costs in a given year; Cap 1 firms which capitalized the totality of R&D costs in a given year; For each model, the coefficient estimated for the independent variable is shown in the first line and the threshold of significance on the second line, between parentheses). The tests are onesided. 
